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Summary
Focused interviews were conducted with the Apollo
astronauts who landed on the Moon. The purpose of
these interviews was to help define extravehicular activity
(EVA) system requirements for future lunar and planetary
missions. Information from the interviews was examined
with particular attention to identifying areas of consensus,
since some commonality of experience is necessary to aid
the design of advanced systems. Results are presented
under the following categories: mission approach;
mission structure; suits; portable life support systems;
dust control; gloves; automation; information, displays,
and controls; rovers and remotes; tools; operations;
training; and general comments. Research recommend-
ations are offered, along with supporting information.
Introduction
The Apollo moon-landing missions consisted of
six flights conducted between July 1969 and December
1972,1 Of the twelve crewmembers who were deployed to
the lunar surface, eleven survive today. As the only
humans who have lived and worked on a solar system
body other than Earth, these eleven men compose a unique
experience base for use in planning future missions.
Although the Apollo astronauts have been extensively
debriefed and have spoken and written widely of their
experiences, we wished to determine if there were any
aspects of that experience that had not yet been fully
explored and that could have relevance in the design and
development of future extravehicular activity (EVA)
systems. The primary objective of this study was to
determine if there were areas of consensus among those
with operational lunar experience that could be of help in
planning EVAs for future missions; a secondary objective
* SAIC, Houston, Texas.
** Decision Systems, Los Altos, California.
lThe Apollo program was comprised of 17 missions. Missions
11-17 were planned as manned Moon-landing flights. Missions
11, 12, and 14-17 successfully landed on the lunar surface and
returned to Earth. Apollo 13 was aborted after an explosion in
an oxygen tank; the crew returned safely to Earth.
was to explicate any other insights that could help further
the planning process.
The intended primary audience for this study is mission
planners and scientists and engineers responsible for
EVA system design. However, we anticipate that various
aspects of the report may also be of interest to a wider
readership and it is written to be accessible to anyone
with a general interest in EVA.
This study followed a request made by the Office of
Exploration, NASA Headquarters, to the New Initiatives
Office at Johnson Space Center (JSC). The study team
was headed by Robert Callaway of the New Initiative
Office and included members of the Crew and Thermal
Systems Division at JSC and the Aerospace Human
Factors Research Division and the Advanced Life
Support Division at Ames Research Cente r (ARC).
Participation of the astronauts was solicited through the
Office of Exploration, with the concurrence and
cooperation of the JSC Astronaut Office.
Methodology
Approach
The approach taken in this study differs in several
significant ways from that of related studies. First, most
astronaut reports concentrate on the responses of single
individuals. Such reports frequently contain a number of
direct quotes which themselves become the basis for
supporting a particular avenue of development. However,
it is often unclear whether the experience reported is a
general finding or describes the response of one individual
or the results of a particular mission sequence. In the
present study, we were interested in capturing common
experiences across missions and individuals.
After considering the benefits and drawbacks of various
approaches, we decided to utilize a focused interview
approach, with each respondent being interviewed
separately. A focused interview balances structured and
open-ended responses. It is an informal, conversational
approach in which many topics can be discussed, but one
in which a pre-determined set of topics is always covered.
Thedecisiontousefocusedinterviewswasinfluenced
bothbythepopulationofpotentialrespondentsandby
thenatureoftheinformationsought.Focusedinterviews
tendtoproducegoodresultswhenthenumberof
individualsi relativelysmall,whenthenumberofareas
tobeexploredisdefinedandlimited,andwhenthedesire
istoprovidemaximumopportunityfornewdirectionsto
betakenorforresponsestobeofferedthatwerenot
anticipatedinadvance.
Anotheressentialdifferencebetweenthisstudyandprior
reportsoftheApollomissionsi thatheastronautswere
beingaskednotjusttorecollectandtorecounttheir
experiencesbuttoprojectapplicableaspectsoftheir
experiencestoanewsituationwithquitedifferent
requirements.Inordertohelptheastronautsmakethis
transition,weneededto(1)makethemaware(ifthey
werenotalreadyaware)ofcurrentthinkingabout,and
examplesof,post-ApolloEVAsystemdesigns,and
(2)provideamodelorscenariorepresentativeofpossible
future xplorationflights.Tomeetthefirstrequirement,
ademonstrationr omwassetupinwhichavarietyof
EVAequipmentdesigns,includingrecentdesigns,could
beshown.Tomeetthesecondrequirement,weadopted
theFirstLunarOutpost(FLO)missionasarepresentative
modeloffutureflights.2
Interview Content
Existing lunar surface information- The preparation of
interview materials began with a thorough search of all
documents and other materials related to the experiences
of the Apollo astronauts on the lunar surface. Debriefing
materials, special articles, memos, and all videotapes
taken on the lunar surface were reviewed to gain an
understanding of what the experiences had been and what
information had previously been reported. Conversations
were also held with several researchers who, for other
reasons, had interviewed, or were in the process of
interviewing, the Apollo astronauts. In reviewing
previous and ongoing activities, we were attempting to
understand, to the extent possible, what was already
known about the lunar-surface experience and to avoid
wasting time in discussing things that had previously
been documented.
EVA system requirements- The second phase of
preparation addressed information that was considered
most important by those charged with the design and
development of EVA systems. A series of interviews
2The First Lunar Outpost was an exercise conducted by the
Exploration Projects Office at Johnson Space Center in the
spring of 1992 to explicate design and operational requirements
needed to support a crew of four for 45 days on the lunar
surface.
was held with members of the Extravehicular Systems
Branch at ARC in order to understand the range of issues
that should be addressed and to identify those areas where
astronaut input could be helpful. Individual interviews
were held with nine members of this branch. Several
group meetings were also held that included these nine
individuals and others. In addition to the issues raised in
these sessions, all were invited to suggest questions that
they would like to have addressed.
In a parallel effort at JSC, input was solicited from
individuals involved in the design of suits, gloves, and
other EVA systems. Six telephone interviews were
conducted by the first author with various members of the
JSC Crew and Thermal Systems Division, most of whom
were members of the EVA Branch. Some of these
individuals, in turn, solicited additional input from
contractors and other personnel.
In all, input was received from a large number of people
on the forefront of planning for various aspects of
advanced EVA systems. This input was used only to
develop the astronaut interviews and is not otherwise
reflected in this report.
Content selection- With a relatively clear view of both
the reported astronaut experiences and the EVA system
needs, the next step was to determine the interview
content. A number of suggested items were eliminated
because they were already answered as fully as could be
expected, they were too narrowly drawn, or they did not
relate particularly to the experiences of the Apollo
astronauts. The issues or questions remaining were
organized into areas and assigned a value according to
their design importance and the likelihood that they could
be answered. This culling process resulted in twelve
primary and one general topic area of inquiry, each with
multiple, prioritized associated issues. These topics and
the issues and questions associated with them were further
reviewed by members of the EVA Systems Branch at
ARC, by members of the EVA Branch at JSC, and by the
Project Director in the New Initiatives Office at JSC.
Interview Plan
It was important that the interview be structured enough
to ensure that predetermined issues would be addressed
but unstructured enough to allow discussion to flow in
unanticipated and potentially more important directions.
The interview design plan is described below.
After making introductions and explaining the purpose of
the interview, the respondent was given an opportunity to
present any information he thought relevant or to express
any opinions he wished. Written notes, rather than tape
recordings, were used in order to provide a relaxed
2
atmosphereandtoemphasizethatit wastheideasthat
wereimportant,nothewordingusedtoexpressthem.
Followingthepreliminaries,achofthefocusedtopics
wereintroducedanddiscussed.Thebasicobjectivewas
simplytohearwhatherespondenthadtosayaboutthe
subject.However,foreachtopic,wealsohadanumber
ofspecificissuesinmind.If answersdidnotflowinthe
generaldiscussion,specificquestionswereasked.These
focused-topicdiscussionsandthequestionsa sociated
withthemwereplannedtooccupymostoftheinterview
period.Followingthediscussionffocusedtopics,
questionsrelatedtothespecificexperiencesofthe
particularastronautortohisparticularmissionwere
raised,asappropriate.Finally,therespondentwasasked
againif therewereanyissueshewishedtoaddressthat
hadnotbeendiscussedoranythingelsehewishedtoadd.
BeforeconductingtheinterviewswiththeApollo
astronauts,heinterviewcontentandformatwerepre-
testedunderconditionssimilartothoseoftheactual
interviews.Thetestsubjectforthistestinterviewasa
volunteerwhohadtrainedwiththeApolloastronauts,but
who,formedicalreasons,hadnotflownduringthe
Apolloprogram.Thispre-testinghelpedustoboth
validatetheprocessandtotrimthelengthofthe
interviewdowntoamanageableperiod.
Procedures
Of the eleven surviving Apollo astronauts who landed on
the moon, eight agreed to participate in this study. Each
astronaut was scheduled for a half-day, 4-hr session. The
sessions were conducted over two 1-week periods during
March 1993.
Approximately the first 30 min of each session were
devoted to a description of the FLO mission, which
served as an example of a future exploration flight. This
session set the stage for what we were asking the
astronaut to do, that is, to think in terms of a four-person,
45-day mission. Although basically presentational, this
session provided an opportunity for the astronaut to ask
questions and to discuss issues of interest to him. Some
respondents offered important comments during this
initial session. These comments were noted and included
along with those from the interview process.
Following the briefing, the astronaut and the study team
moved to the area where the flight suits, gloves, and other
technology demonstrations had been set up. The
astronauts viewed video clips of lunar-surface operations
from Apollo showing some of the typical astronaut
movements such as loping, running, and hammering, as
well as some off-nominal movements such as recovery
from falls and retrieving tools. The purpose was to re-
evoke their Apollo experience and to help them project
and think about future requirements. They then examined
suits and related equipment in chronological order from
Apollo to the advanced designs. The astronauts tried on
several versions of pressurized gloves, and were shown
new designs, for example, of portable life support
systems (PLSS) and methods for suit entry, dust control,
and boot testing. This hour or so of technology
demonstration elicited many comments that were
captured as part of the interview process.
Following the technology demonstration, the astronaut
and the interview team returned to the interview room.
The interview team consisted of three individuals, one of
whom had primary responsibility for conducting the
interview. The other two had the primary responsibility
of taking notes on the responses of the interviewee and
the secondary responsibility of supporting the main
interviewer in conducting the interview. A fourth
member of the study team from the advanced technology
group was also present to answer any specific hardware
questions that might arise in the course of the interview.
The interview lasted about two hours.
Results
The results presented here are derived from the responses
of the eight astronauts interviewed. The main purpose of
this exercise was to identify those areas where the
experiences of the lunar-surface astronauts led to
basically similar conclusions and where, therefore,
planning lessons could be learned. 3 These areas of
general agreement are reported in this section and
constitute the main results of this investigation .4
Mission Approach
A major theme arising from discussions of mission
approach was the need for a mission and design
philosophy that emphasizes a total system--one that takes
into account the integration of the person and the crew as
a unit with the facilities and equipment. Respondents
noted that both the mission itself and the EVA facilities
3The various Apollo missions differed from one another in
important respects. For instance, later missions were longer in
duration than earlier missions; involved a rover vehicle; called
for three, rather than two or one, EVA(s); etc. These differences
imply different experiences. However, because the total number
of astronauts who landed on the lunar surface is so small and we
were asking them to project to a new, future scenario, the
responses of all participants are pooled in the description of
results.
4A number of additional comments were offered by one or by a
minority of respondents. These comments are captured and
recorded in appendix A of this report.
andequipmentshouldbedesignedtofit thetaskstobe
accomplished,andnotthereverse.Designstrategy
shouldbemarkedbysimplicity and also reliability. The
design should address only reasonably anticipated task
requirements and should try to neither include capabilities
that are not needed nor events that are unlikely to occur.
In other words, design for the ordinary, not the
extraordinary. A related response, voiced by several
respondents, was that mission planning should not be
based on a risk-free criterion. System design should, in
general, address normal or expected events, with
provision for emergency operations developed in parallel.
A second theme was the need for heightened autonomy
and self-reliance on exploration missions. Primarily
because of the length of future missions, the respondents
saw a far more active role for the crewmembers in plan-
ning and executing their activities and in maintaining
themselves and their equipment than has been required
previously.
A third idea expressed by a number of respondents was
that exploration missions such as the FLO mission need
not be, and should not be, as tightly scheduled and
controlled as were earlier missions. For future, longer
missions, astronauts need to accomplish overall mission
goals, but they also need to operate at their own pace, to
appreciate the experience they are having, and simply to
relax and have fun.
Mission Structure
The respondents viewed the two-man EVA team as the
desired basic unit of exploration. However, most felt that
a one-person, limited EVA (brief duration, close to the
habitat) would be acceptable and that flexibility would be
needed in determining how particular EVAs should be
constituted. For instance, some activities might call for a
different mix of team members, whereas others might
require three or even four crew members to be out on an
EVA at the same time.
Regarding the amount of time spent per EVA over a
45-day mission, the consensus was that a 7-8-hr day was
generally appropriate. Most respondents felt that, overall,
an EVA every other day was quite doable and, if any-
thing, represented too little EVA. However, a number
made the point that exactly when EVAs were run (e.g.,
one day on, one day off) should not be fixed in advance
but should be adjusted to take advantage of how the
individuals are feeling, to address the tasks that need to
be accomplished, and to keep the EVA activity fresh and
interesting over the duration of the mission.
Suits
The importance of simplicity and reliability dominated
responses of the subjects to suit features. 5 For instance,
respondents thought that being able to pull one's hands
inside the suit to shake out the fingers or to reposition the
microphone was an interesting idea but one that was not
worth the complexity it would add. Respondents
generally approved of changes that would reduce the
required number of connections between the suit and the
life-support system. Some also expressed concern that
changes could increase the number of joints and bearings.
These latter changes were perceived as introducing new
potential points of failure. In this connection, several
respondents specifically advised against introducing any
more mobility into the suit than was required by the
EVAs anticipated.
Regarding the requirements of habitat pressure, suit
pressure, and pre-breathing, there was total agreement
that the driving consideration should be adequate suit
flexibility and mobility. The dominant belief was that
suit flexibility demands that suit pressure be low,
implying high 02 concentration. Several respondents
suggested that a high-O2/low-total-pressure approach
should be actively pursued. The argument was that the
purpose of the lunar expedition is EVA; the purpose of
EVA requires performing useful work; and a way to
accomplish useful work is to be able to move about the
surface and grasp objects easily. They felt that an 02 suit
environment approaching 100% would best accomplish
this end. The issue of habitat and suit gas mixture for
missions of extended duration was a recurrent theme and
will be referred to again in later sections of this report.
There was less agreement on the relationship between
suit pressure and habitat pressure. Some respondents felt
that EVA crews will need to be able to get into their suits
and exit very quickly, implying a low habitat pressure as
well as a low suit pressure. Others felt that the time
required for pre-breathing is not an issue of major
importance. Although respondents favor operating in
low-pressure suits, if a higher pressure suit is deemed
5Suits worn during Apollo missions served both intravehicular
(IVA) and EVA requirements. They were worn during all
critical IVA flight phases (liftoff, docking, landing) as well as in
the pressurized EVA condition. In addition, they were to
provide protection in an emergency. The combined IVA/EVA
uses dictated a number of design features of the Apollo suit: It
had to be capable of operating in a pressurized state for up to
5 days; for IVA comfort, it could not employ any hard elements;
and life support connectors had to mate with the life-support
systems of the command module, the lunar module, and the
PLSS. In contrast, the suit used aboard the Space Shuttle is used
only for EVAs and so is free of the design compromises
required for the Apollo suit.
necessary,theygenerallyapprovetheideaofavariable-
pressurearrangement.Thiswouldallowone,for
instance,totravelonaroveratahigherpressureandto
adaptintransittolowerpressures'foroperatinginhigh
workloadsituations.However,again,thisacceptance
wasconditionedontheassumptionthathevariable-
pressuref aturewouldnotaddsignificantlytothe
complexityofthesuit.
Theissueoftheweight/bulk/mass/volumeofEVAsuits
resultedinacomplexofresponses.Tothespecificissue
ofweight,somerespondentsdidnotseesuitheaviness
perseasaproblem,withacouplesuggestingthatmore
weightmighthavebeenhelpfulduringtheApolloEVAs.
Otherespondents(generallyreferringtopost-Apollo
suit-designconcepts)feltthatsuitweightwasindeeda
problemandthatlimitingtheweightofsuitswasan
importantconsiderationforfutureflights.Thosewho
emphasizedtheneedtolimitsuitweightalsotendedto
emphasizetheimportanceofreducingthevolume
requiredtotransportandstorethesuits.Although
distinctionsweredrawnregardingtheparticularquestion
ofweight,herewerenodifferencesinresponsetothe
broaderquestionofbulkandmass.Everyoneperceived
bulkandmasstobeanareawhereimprovementis
needed.Numerousreferencesweremadetotheneedto
pullthesuitclosertothebodyandtoreducetheinertia
involvedinstarting,stopping,andchangingdirection.It
appearsthatfromthestandpointofsurfaceoperations,the
idealunarorplanetarysurfacesuit(andgloves)would
hugthebodyasasecondskin,foldintoasmallpackage,
andweighjustenoughtoprovideleverageandtokeep
theindividualfromliftingoff thesurface.
Concernwasexpressedthatsuitsmustlastfor45days
andbemaintainablewithonlyroutinecare.Although
therewasagreementthatasuitthatistobewornfor
45daysmustfit verywell,therewasonlylimited
resistancetotheideaofmodularityinsuitsorevento
sharedsuits.Gloves,however,wereviewedasrequiring
customization.Modularity,properlyimplemented,was
seenbymostasanaidtosuitmaintenance,asan
effectivewayofassuringtheavailabilityofsparesand
backups,andasareasonablemeansofcontrollingcosts.
OnthequestionofpreparationtimeforEVAs,the
bottom-liner sponsewasthatwhatwasacceptablewas
whateverit took.However,therewasacleardesireto
keepthistimerelativelybriefandproductiveandto
combineseveralctivities,includingpre-breathing,
attendingtophysicalneeds,donning,suitchecking,and
mentallypreparingforEVA.
Tworelatedsuitideas,rearentryandexternaldocking,
drewmixedresponses,a didtheideaofahardsuit
generally.Rearentrywouldhavetheastronautenterand
exitthesuitthroughadoorinthebackof theuppertorso
ofahardsuit.ExternaldockingWouldmeshthisaperture
areatoasimilaropeningintheairlock,allowingthe
crewmembertoexitthesuitandenterthehabitatwhile
thesuitremainedoutside.Someviewedrear-entryasan
aidtoone-persondonninganddeploymentofthesuitand
externaldockingasasignificantadvantagefordust
controlandgeneralstorage.Othersfeltthatthesedesign
concepts,andespeciallyexternaldocking,introduced
newconcernsincludingsealingdifficulties,changeout
limitations,andproblemswithsuitmaintenance.No
directeffortwasmadetosolicitresponsesregarding
preferencesforhardorsoftsuits.However,since
examplesofbothwereavailablein thetechnology
demonstrationarea,anumberofcommentsaddressedthis
issue.Reactiontothehardsuitappearedtoturnonhow
therespondentbelievedthevariousrequirementsfora
45-daymissioncouldbestbemet.Clearly,allthings
beingequal,everyonewouldpreferasoft,close-fitting,
pliablesuit.However,takingintoaccountFLO-type
conditions,conclusionsvaried.Opinionwasalmost
equallydividedamongthosewhoopposedtheconceptof
ahardsuit,thosewhowereopentotheidea,andthose
whofavoredasoftsuitbutwhobelievedthatsome
aspectsofahard-suitdesignmightimproveperformance.
Portable Life Support Systems
The portable life support system used on the Apollo
missions was given high marks for its functional
capabilities in controlling atmosphere and temperature.
Structurally, it did force one to assume a forward
position, although most adapted readily to this shift. A
• few who were on earlier flights reported dehydration and
difficulty with the placement of controls. These problems
were corrected on later flights; in any event, they were
generally judged to be minor. Of more concern was the
general mass of the system.
Most would prefer a system (i.e., the suit plus the PLSS)
that has less mass and is easy to move around. A possible
approach to reducing the mass of the pack that must be
carried is to have astronauts change out consumables.
Although most respondents did not express a strong
objection to doing this, some thought it was not a good
idea and all were concerned that such a change-out be
accomplished safely and easily. (Safety and added
complexity were the major stumbling blocks, but some
also expressed concern about limiting how far one could
wander and about having to break one's attention away
from the primary work activity in order to deal with life-
support issues.) The possibility of lung-powered or
pressurized breathing was viewed with even greater
skepticism. For many, it did not appear workable but most
werewillingtoconsiderit. Incontrasttotheseinterested-
but-skepticalresponses,theapproachofusingumbilicals
whileworkingneararoverwasplainlyrejectedasbothtoo
dangerous,becauseofthepossibilityoftrippingover
cables,andtoorestrictiveandcumbersome.
RespondentsgenerallyfavoredintegratingthePLSSwith
thesuitasawayofreducingfailurepoints;ofkeeping
donninganddoffingtimestoaminimum;andofavoiding
snaggingonlines,cables,andprojections.
Dust Control
Dust, a pervasive problem on the lunar surface, was
viewed by the respondents primarily in terms of
developing a strategy for management. Many thought the
best means of control was to keep equipment that was
exposed to dust separate from the living areas of the
habitat. Airlocks or similar attached storage areas were
seen as important in providing the space for maintenance
of suits and other equipment. The role of tightly sealed
connectors and covers to keep the dust out of the suit and
the habitat was also stressed. This emphasis on isolating
exposed materials, comp!emented by the elimination of
dust through cleaning, vacuuming, mesh floors, etc. and
strict enforcement of maintenance procedures was seen as
the primary approach to dust management. A secondary
line of defense emphasized avoiding disturbing the dust
in the first place and preparing areas where high traffic is
anticipated (e.g., around the habitat) so that a stable and
non-deteriorating surface could be maintained. Some
also suggested that materials might be selected with dust-
avoidance or dust-control capabilities in mind, such as
smooth surfaces and materials that are dust-repelling
rather than dust-attracting.
The prevalence of dust was not generally thought to be a
health issue. Some did believe, however, that over long
periods of time it could develop into a health problem if
not properly controlled.6
Gloves
There was consensus that gloves/hand dexterity is among
the most important EVA improvements needed. There
was a restrained approval of the changes that have been
made in the gloves since Apollo but the general feeling
was that these improvements are not nearly enough.
Virtually all respondents reported that the gloves they had
worn on Apollo imposed serious limitations on move-
ments of the fingers, hands, and forearms. These
6Breathing silica dust over time (as in quarry work) can result in
silicosis, a chronic lung disease. It is likely that prolonged
exposure to lunar dust would result in similar lung problems.
limitations ranged from lack of adequate tactility and
feedback, to reduced performance and muscle fatigue, to
sores and bruises. Most found that muscle fatigue
disappeared overnight and thought that it probably did
not pose a cumulative threat. Several suggestions were
offered including customization and careful fitting to
anticipate pressurization changes and exercise and
training to prepare the hands for a 45-day mission.
Acceptance or rejection of the concept of end effectors to
extend hand capability seemed to depend on how
intractable one thinks the glove problem is. Clearly,
everyone would prefer a glove that stays in place, allows
gripping without significantly extra effort, and provides
an acceptable level of dexterity and feedback. This goal
continues to be of highest priority. However, a few of the
respondents felt that end effectors could be useful for
some tasks and that the idea should be further examined.
Automation
There was broad and high-level support for integrating
automation into the EVA system wherever appropriate.
Automation was seen as especially useful when activities
are repetitive or when extended setup times are required.
Automation was deemed acceptable over a wide range of
activities including setup, monitoring, and control.
However, there was also concern that backups, manual
overrides, and selectable levels of automation be available.
There was some difference of opinion about whether the
use of automation should extend to intricate activities such
as landing on the lunar surface, but, in general, automation
was viewed as desirable, provided it did not contribute
substantially to mission complexity and that it remain
under the control of the crewmember. Several respondents
also mentioned the extended role they saw for robotics
working in conjunction with crewmembers.
Automated suit checkout generally was viewed
positively, provided that proper safety controls and
backups were in place. Opinion on the desirability of
automated control of suit atmosphere and temperature
differed, with some thinking it would be workable and
others believing it to be either too complex or having too
great a lag time.
Information, Displays, and Controls
The respondents wanted the information presented to be
simple and limited to only what was needed. Primarily,
they wanted information relevant to the current
operational task. Secondarily, they were interested in
having safety-related status information. Most felt this
status information should be available on a call-up basis.
Alarms were favored for very significant events, but the
preferencefornormaloperations was to have the ground
or the habitat in an active monitoring role, calling issues
to the attention of the crew only if necessary. In this way
the respondents felt the EVA crew could concentrate on
the task they were performing.
Visual displays were envisioned as supporting opera-
tional tasks, with aural displays used for alarms. A
number of respondents expressed interest in examining
how head-up displays might be incorporated into EVAs,
although reservations were also expressed that they
might not work well in EVA situations. Similarly,
although there was a general interest in the possibility of
voice-activated displays, there were also reservations
about their reliability and a concern that their use could
be at cross-purposes with other voice communications.
A number of respondents also mentioned the importance
of having good visual and aural communication links
with both the ground and the habitat. The habitat was
frequently mentioned as a key communication node in
the EVA communication network, replacing the
monitoring function that ground control had played in
the Apollo missions; it was also seen as having
information requirements of its own associated with
laboratory activities such as information processing and
data reduction.
Checklists are a common form of activity management.
Electronic checklists are now being introduced in a
number of areas. These systems have the advantage of
being able to capture and organize information as well as
display it in new ways that aid the user. The respondents
in this study appreciated the need for rapid information
updating and display in support of lunar and planetary
operations. They also accepted, in concept, the use of
electronic displays and checklists to present this
information to the EVA crew.
Rovers and Remotes
The use of the rover to provide auxiliary and/or
supplementary life support was generally considered to
be desirable, provided the disconnections/connections
could be accomplished routinely and safely and that the
activity did not add substantially to the complexity of the
mission. The added distances that could be traversed
were mentioned by several respondents as a significant
advantage of rover-supplied consumables. Potential use
of a rover as a safe haven in a radiation event drew mixed
responses. Those who did not support this concept felt
that it introduced too much complexity at an early stage
of exploration. Respondents agreed that a second rover
was desirable at some early point in follow-on missions
in order to extend surface operations and also as a backup
to the primary vehicle.
The respondents thought that loading, storage, and access
to equipment, tools, and supplies need to be improved,
possibly by the use of a snap-on pallet or some other
device. While there were other specific suggestions
about what might be provided on the next generation of
rovers, several emphasized keeping the rover simple,
thereby allowing repairs (to the rover itself, as well as to
facilities and equipment) to be accomplished on-site by
the surface crew.
Tools
There was general agreement that it is difficult to keep
equipment in place on the lunar surface, primarily because
of its low weight under lunar gravity, There is also the
problem of surface cables not lying fiat. However, most
respondents thought the difficulty of managing and using
tools to be a more important concern. The light weight of
the tOols was mentioned as a factor but the main problem
reported was in gripping--and particularly in maintaining
a grip---on hand tools. The necessity of continuously
exerting pressure just to hold on to a tool caused consider-
able difficulty, particularly when using the hammer. Some
respondents related these problems primarily to limitations
of the suit and glove and did not consider them tool issues
per se.
Regarding what might be done to reduce the muscle
fatigue associated with manipulating hand tools, a
promising suggestion was to provide an attachment such
as a wrist loop or other means of securing the tool. With
this, the user could relax his grip without losing the tool.
Some saw value in trying to achievea better fit between
glove and tool handle. However, most though t that
having to snap tools on to a customized handle was more
trouble than it was worth. There was also little
enthusiasm for walking, sitting, or other aids, with several
commenting that they had rested adequately simply by
leaning on the suit. 7
Regarding access to tools and storage of samples, several
suggestions were offered. Most found the buddy system
of tool access to be acceptable Under most anticipated
conditions. However, other arrangements would have to
be made if one were operating alone. For collecting and
carrying samples, something with an wide mouth, like a
shopping bag, was the respondents' container of choice.
Operations
There was significant agreement among respondents
about how planning and implementing for an FLO-type
7This raises the question of how much more tiring it might be to
operate in a suit which does not support itself.
missionshouldproceed.A generalmovementtoward
increasinglygreatercrewautonomyinday-to-day
planningandactivitywouldbecombinedwithstrong
groundinvolvementi overallplanningofmission
objectivesandoperations.Ingeneral,missionoperations
wouldbeplannedtoahighdegreeinadvanceofthe
missionbyall involvedgroupsinordertomeet
operationalndscientificobjectives.Thisplanning
wouldserveasthebasisforfurtherplanningofnear-term
activity,whichwouldbedevelopedjointlybythecrew
andthegrounduringdailydiscussions.However,the
crewwouldhaveahighdegreeofflexibilityin
implementingthedailyplanandcouldadaptschedulesto
fit eventsastheyevolved.Severaloftherespondents
expressedthedesiretobeabletospendasmuchtimeas
necessaryindocumentingscientificfindings,particularly
in theeventofaserendipitousdi covery.It wasassumed
thatthegroundwouldretainasignificantroleinplanning
andmonitoringduringEVA.Onereasongivenwasto
freethecrewforscientificworkbyrelievingthemof
detailedplanningandmonitoringtasks.Withlater
missions,thehabitatcrewwasseenastakingonan
increasingroleinplanning,andespeciallyinmonitoring
EVAoperations.
A relatedissuewasthereliabilityofequipmenti
general,andof experimentsinparticular.The
respondentsfeltthatexperimentsshouldbedesigned
withaviewtowardmakingthemlessensitivetothe
elementswhilealsoallowingforeasyrepair,if that
shouldbecomenecessary.
Givenadequateconsumables,thelimitingEVAfactor
duringnominaloperationswasgenerallyassumedtobe
fatigue,bothmentalandphysical.Foroff-nominal
events,uchasasuitorglovepuncture,lossofPLSS,or
habitatfailure,respondentsviewedthepreferredsolutions
fromtwoperspectives.First,foreachprojectedfailure,it
mustbedeterminedinadvancewhenonecouldand
shouldattempttofix theprobleminsitu.Second,
missionrulesreflectingthosedecisionsmustbeputin
placeandstrictlyenforced.Forinstance,walking20km
orsobacktothehabitatfollowingafailureoftherover,
althoughastretch,wasconsideredquitedoableunder
favorableconditionsandif required.Thisdistance,
modifiedbytimeconstraints,consumablesr maining,
andsurfaceconditions,couldthenformthebasisofa
missionruleinvolvingroverfailure.
DuringEVAs,astronauts'visioncanbeimpairedby
severalfactors.DuringApollo,theperipheralvisionof
astronautswaslimitedbythephysicalstructureofthe
helmetandmovementwithinthesuit.Othervisual
problemssuchashighcontrast,shadows,andwashout
relatetothecharacteristicsofthelunarsurfaceenviron-
mentitself.Thegeneralbeliefwasthattosomedegree
onecouldadapttothesedifferencesovertime.Thevisual
areathatcausedthemostsignificantsurfaceproblems
involvesthejudgmentofdistance.Problemsinjudging
distances,combinedwiththemoregeneralconditionofnot
knowingwhereoneis,indicatesthatrange-finding,
navigational,ndrelatedequipmentmustbeavailable,
eitheraspartofarovervehicleorinsomeotherway.
Regardingoperatingduringhighnoonandduringlunar
night,therespondentsfeltthatneitherconditionshould
necessarilyprecludeEVAs,providedacceptablethermal
conditionscouldbemaintained.Forthehigh-noon
condition,mostfeltthataking3to5daysoutof the
missionwasanunnecessaryp ecaution.However,they
alsofeltthatbecausevisualconditionswouldbedifficult,
it wouldbeadvisabletoplanactivitiesclosertothehabitat.
Forlunarnight,respondentsbelievedthatoperationscould
proceedfairlyroutinelywithsupplementarylightingas
needed.Somerespondentsal ostressedthevalueofusing
teleoperationswhereEVAwasnotpracticalandalsoasa
supplementtoroutineactivities.
Training
Theastronauts'suggestionsfortrainingdifferedfrom
otherdiscussiontopicsinthatherewaswiderdiversityin
emphasis.Thisdiversityrelatedbothtodifferent
experiencesassociatedwithdifferentmissionsandtothe
interestsofparticularindividuals.Thefollowing
representsa ubsetofsuggestionswheretherewascross-
respondentagreement.A moredetailedlistoftraining
suggestions,reflectingmorediverseresponses,is
includedinappendixA.
A numberofrespondentsmentionedtheneedtocross-
traincandidatesforexplorationmissions.Cross-training
wouldalloweachpersontohavebothaprimaryanda
secondaryspecialty.Thiswouldprovideflexibilityin the
overallsizingandorganizationfcrewsaswellasadda
safetyfactortoeachmission.
Respondentsalsomentionedtheneedtotrainunder
realisticonditions.Specificareasincludedtrainingwith
toolsofthesameweightandstiffnessaswouldobtainon
thelunarorplanetarysurface,maintainingone'sown
equipmentduringthetrainingprocess,operatingin the
pressurizedsuitandfortheextendednumberofhoursone
wouldhavetowearit ona45-daymission,andtraining
forthemissionasanintegratedwholeandnotjustas
segmentedparts.
A thirdareamentionedbyseveralrespondentsrelatedto
continuingtrainingonthelunarorplanetarysurface.
Specifically,theconcernwasthatcrewmembersp epare
mentallyandholdrehearsalssothattheywillbeprepared
foractivitieslaterinthe mission or to respond to an
emergency. Conducting fire drills and reviewing
procedures (for instance, for liftoff) were seen as essential
to maintaining the skill and alertness needed to perform
optimally under actual conditions.
General Comments
In anticipating what issues might prove most significant
for an FLO-type mission, responses converged on the
issue of sustained mental performance. Various
respondents expressed this concern in terms of the
potential for strained interpersonal relations, for boredom,
for running out of mental energy, and, especially, for
becoming complacent: Respondents suggested a dual
approach to keeping a sound and active mental state over
an extended period. The first element related to the
quality and the scheduling of the work. The sustained
availability of meaningful work that could be scheduled
by the crew with a high degree of flexibility was seen as
essential. The second, complementary element was the
availability of relaxing and restorative physical and
mental activity. The combination of sufficient (but not
excessive) quality work, along with the time to fully take
in and enjoy the experience, was the approach
recommended for avoiding errors and sustaining
performance over the full mission duration.
Conclusions
The results of this study revealed a level of agreement
among the Apollo lunar surface astronauts that can be
summarized as follows:
1. Emphasis should be given to the integration of crew,
equipment, and facilities as a total system.
2. All subsystem designs should be based on fundamental
principles of simplicity and reliability. Given a trade-off,
simplicity and reliability are to be preferred over added
functionality.
3. The EVA hardware-related items most in need of
improvement are the bulkiness/inflexibility of suits and
the (inadequate) manipulability/dexterity of the gloves.
4. Equipment should be designed to fit EVA task
requirements and the training of crews should be on
actual tasks, equipment, etc.
5. Future missions will require increased crew autonomy.
Crews will need greater flexibility in operations,
particularly in daily scheduling.
6. The habitat crew will play an increasingly important
role in supporting EVA crew operations, replacing some
of the activities previously performed by ground control.
7. High levels of maintainability and reparability must be
designed into experiments as well as into equipment and
facilities generally.
8. Extended missions will require ways to achieve and
sustain high-level mental performance.
Research Recommendations
During the course of this investigation, certain issues
came to our attention that suggested the need for follow-
on research and related activities. Although outside the
parameters of this study, and certainly outside the
expertise of the authors, we feel that these issues are of
sufficient interest and importance to be brought to the
attention of those more qualified to judge them. • With
these caveats, we offer the' following recommendations
for consideration. Information supporting these
recommendations is given as appendix B.
1. Conduct an analysis/investigation of the mid- and
long-term physiological effects of breathing pure and
high-concentration 02 at reduced pressures. As a part of
this effort, an understanding should also be acquired of
human adaptability to mixed-gas, low-pressure
environments, such as those experienced by mountain
dwellers and climbers.
2. Conduct an analysis/investigation of the flammability
issues associated with materials in low-pressure, high-
oxygen environments.
3. Conduct a focused evaluation into the availability and
near-term possibilities of new materials as they relate to
desired suit characteristics (weight, bulk, mass,
storability, serviceability, durability, comfort).
4. Conduct a detailed task analysis to determine specific
performance requirement s for advanced missions as
related to suits, gloves, and other elements of the EVA
system. Determine the priority of improvements needed
in terms of mission tasks.
5. Conduct an analysis of optimal mobility requirements,
specifically the relationship between the workload
required to perform required tasks with a limited-mobility
suit and the workload required to perform similar tasks in
a high-mobility suit.
6. Incorporate, on an on-going basis, the up-to-date
knowledge of orthopedic (specifically hand)
researchers and practitioners into the glove design and
develop and incorporate objectively determined
standards of performance and measurement into the
evaluations of gloves.
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Appendix A
Observations of Individual
Respondents
Some comments offered by the individual astronauts
who participated in this study reflect particular
experiences, viewpoints, interests, or areas of special
expertise. These suggestions fall outside the primary
focus of this report which is areas of agreement or
consensus. However, these individual insights could
also be of value in the planning process and are included
here for further consideration.
Mission Approach and Mission Structure
A number of different comments centered on long-term
effects and on concern over how missions and systems
are approached. One such concern was that the EVA,
and not the habitat, needs to be the expressed central
focus of the mission and the driver of the design criteria.
One respondent expressed a strong view that our recent
EVA development efforts are overly complicated and that
these efforts could set the Agency on a path from which it
would be difficult to recover. A view was also offered
that EVA requires unique physical and mental abilities
and that we must not hesitate to select only those who
possess these special skills and to train them rigorously so
that they are able to perform maximally over the entire
mission. Regarding the mission length, more than one
respondent expressed the view that evacuation would be
difficult or impossible over a 45-day mission and that
illness should not be considered a condition that results in
a return to Earth.
Suits
Regarding the construction and care of suits, one
respondent argued against the use of metal joints, on the
basis that they do not fail gracefully. Another suggestion
was that suits should be equipped with dams to control
pressure loss resulting from a puncture or the loss of a
glove. Another respondent had a similar idea, suggesting
that the suit could be sealed at the wrist and that changing
gloves could be a rover-supported function. Regarding
suit maintenance, one respondent suggested that all
astronauts be made responsible for their own suits during
training. The thrust of this suggestion is the requirement
to learn the logistics of suit maintenance, a responsibility
that will have to be assumed by crewmembers during a
45-day FLO-type mission.
Portable Life Support System
The issue of how to replenish life-support expendables
resulted in several suggestions. One involved reducing
the need for power by using passive cooling, such as
Mylar protection. It was also pointed out that plugging
into a rover for power would be easy, whereas making the
connections for water and gases would be consider-ably
more difficult, suggesting that partial replenishment
might be the most useful approach. Since, as was pointed
out, the critical problem would be a double failure (PLSS
and rover), a condition more likely over long missions,
emergency options such as cached expendables or the
ability to PlUg into a buddy's life support system should
also be considered.
Dust Control
It was noted that dust has a particularly adverse effect on
fasteners, impairing zippers and destroying the
connecting capability of Velcro. One suggestion was to
use something very simple, like a cloth cover, to protect
joints and connections. One respondent offered the
opinion that cleaning had to be accomplished on an
enforced, daily basis in order to keep ahead of the dust.
A second dust issue concerns the structure and function
of the airlock. At least one respondent felt that in
addition to suit storage, the airlock should house other
dirt-prone work areas, such as the geology laboratory.
However, another respondent had a different idea,
suggesting that rather than one airlock, the habitat should
be equipped with two one-person airlocks that could
provide pressurization redundancy.
The lunar habitat is generally conceived of as resting
above the lunar surface. This arrangement offers some
dust protection, since astronauts could scrape their boots
and shake dust from their suits as they climb the ladder.
However, one respondent did not think a highly perched
habitat a good idea, since a 45-day mission presents
multiple opportunities for someone to fall off the ladder.
Gloves
The variety of suggestions offered for glove improvement
indicates both the importance and the difficulty of this
suit feature. With reference to the design of the advanced
series glove, one respondent expressed doubt that the
metacarpal joint would ultimately be helpful since it
might lead to overuse. Another respondent expressed
skepticism concerning the utility of the knuckle joint,
while others saw the need for a smaller wrist ring and an
improved thumb. Additional suggestions included
providing more than one set of gloves and incorporating
'_'_'_C_ PAGE I_AN_ NOT F'M.MED
ii
an understanding of what information is transmitted
through the hands into the basic glove design.
Automation
It was pointed out that time and motion analyses are
needed in order to better understand the requirements
for repetitive activity, the leading candidates for
automation. A specific suggestion was that the process
of deploying experiments, as well as other physically
demanding activities, particularly those that could
cause one to lose footing (e.g., digging or drilling), be
automated. Other suggestions were to apply auto-
mation to the documentation process and to utilize
automation to facilitate the updating as well as the
operational use of checklists.
Information, Displays, and Controls
An audio communication system that allows astronauts
to operate without head attachments such as a "snoopy
cap," was viewed positively, with the proviso that
reliability be preserved. Other information-related
suggestions included a good teleconferencing capability
between the habitat and the ground; a compact method
of reporting PLSS status, including remaining
expendables; and the use of graphics or other visuals
instead of plain textual presentations.
Rovers and Remotes
Although the Lunar Rover used on the later Apollo
missions was viewed favorably, suggestions for
improvements were offered. It was observed that the
steering on the Apollo Lunar Rover was overly sensitive
and that it could climb inclines steep enough to make it
feel unstable to the riders. Suggestions for improvement
ranged from incremental changes to the existing vehicle
to new design ideas. Among the suggestions offered for
modest improvements were wider seats and seatbelts;
gyrostabilized antennae; improved photographic
capabilities through use of a camera on the rover (and
possibly on the helmet); an installed workbench; and
instrument mounts. Other suggestions were for remote
control capability (to call the rover to the work site);
possibly a three-wheeled vehicle; and a closer match
between terrain requirements and rover capabilities.
Several respondents envisioned pressurized rovers, at
least for advanced lunar missions. A more radical
concept was for a pressurized container that could
enclose and transport two or three people, allowing them
to climb in and out or to operate nearby in a remotely
controlled configuration.
Tools
Several suggestions addressed the storage and availability
of tools. It was noted that alternative methods need to be
developed so that it is not necessary to continuously carry
shovels, hammers, etc. Also, tools need to be anchored
so that they are not moved inadvertently. Regarding
storage arrangements, one respondent suggested that for
an FLO-type mission, arranging tools to reflect the EVA
schedule is probably not the right approach and that a
more generic storage arrangement is needed. Another
suggestion was that a system be put in place to track
discarded tools, equipment, etc. for later retrieval. Other
suggestions were to match tools to the handedness of the
user and to include an easily accessed magnifying glass.
Operations
A suggestion for maintaining alertness was to alter the
operating schedule on a continuous basis. Other specific
recommendations included planning operations so that
they would be in phase with circadian rhythms,
conducting maintenance (as possible) in the habitat and
out of the suit, and scheduling maintenance (and
especially the maintenance of suits) when the crew is
rested. It was also pointed out that periodic checks of the
return vehicle need to be called out specifically in the
operating schedule.
Training
Respondents differed in what they emphasized as training
needs. For instance, one respondent thought that training
should focus on the specific tasks of the mission.
Another spoke of the need for generalized training, such
as survival training or stress training, in order to prepare
the individual to deal with unpredictable situations.
Some respondents focused on the physical aspects of
training, such as the need for upper body training and
hand strengthening exercises. Others emphasized various
aspects of mental conditioning; how it could influence
physical and psychological health; and how biofeedback,
virtual reality, and other techniques might be utilized to
train the mind for the rigors of exploration. One
respondent raised the issue of using mind-body control
training as it might specifically he applied to the question
of SPeeding up the pre-breathe process. Others suggested
the possibility that pre-breathe requirements could be
reduced through adaptation.
Overall, an FLO-type mission was seen as requiring
lengthy and thorough training. One respondent suggested
300-400 hr as a minimum period for pressurized suit
training; another thought that 5 or more years would be
needed to master the engineering, scientific,
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physiological, and logistical skills required in order to
maximize performance on a 45-day lunar or planetary
surface mission. This respondent also suggested that
astronauts on such missions spend a full year after the
mission in processing the information they have acquired
and in communicating the experience they have gained.
General Comments '
As mentioned in the main body of this report, the
respondents expressed concern that over a 45-day period
interpersonal relations could become strained and that
morale could deteriorate. Two specific suggestions were
offered as means of helping to maintain crew morale.
One was to equip the habitat with windows or perhaps
with virtual windows. The second was to provide an
opportunity, perhaps on a weekly basis, for a recreational
EVA. Also related is the opinion expressed by one
respondent that a mental attitude of professionalism, that
is, a disciplined and consistent approach to scientific and
related tasks, rather than an attitude of adventure or
daring, would be a useful mechanism for maintaining
productivity over long-duration missions.
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Appendix B
Research Recommendations:
Supporting Material
The information presented in this appendix does not
reflect a thorough investigation of all relevant data.
Rather, it represents a limited attempt to understand the
various problem areas related to lunar or planetary
operations and to make suggestions as to what needs to
be done next.
1. Conduct an analysis/investigation of the mid- and
long-term physiological effects of breathing pure and
high-concentration 02 at reduced pressures. As a part of
this effort, an understanding should also be acquired of
human adaptability to mixed-gas, low-pressure
environments, such as those experienced by mountain
dwellers and climbers.
Space shuttle missions are conducted with a general cabin
atmospheric pressure of 14.7 psi and a normal
atmospheric gas mix and with an EVA 02 pressure of
4.3 psi. This spacecraft mix and pressure is in marked
contrast to early spaceflight in which 100% 02 was the
norm. Some questions concerning the advisability of
using a pure 02 environment arose following the Gemini
flights when a reduction in red cell mass was noted (ref.
1). During the Apollo program, a small amount of
nitrogen was mixed with the oxygen atmosphere,
although the nitrogen tended to disappear when it was
replaced by oxygen as the flight progressed. For Apollo,
cabin pressure for most flight phases was 6.2 psi almost
pure 02 with EVA pressure of 3.8 psi. In Skylab, the
breathing gas and pressure was 74% 02 and 26% N2 at
4.8-5.2 psi with EVA pressure at 3.8 psi.
Questions of the optimal gas mixture and pressure
continue to be raised. Operational protocols that do not
require extensive pre-breathe will be especially important
for lunar and planetary missions that involve significant
periods of EVA. If both cabin pressure and suit pressure
were to be kept low, pre-breathe could be minimized and
glove mobility maximized. Since the issue of high-
versus low-pressure environments is so central to EVA
equipment and mission design, and since it continues to
be debated, we believe the question of oxygen
concentration and ambient pressure should be revisited.
Humans exposed to a one atmosphere, pure 02
environment experience serious physiological effects
known under the blanket name of oxygen toxicity. These
effects can cause serious and progressive dysfunction in
bodily systems, many of which are permanent and some
of which can lead to death. Early research into the use of
low-pressure pure 02 suggested that oxygen toxicity may
be avoided if the pressure is low enough. Work reported
by Barach (ref. 2) and extended by Mullinax and Beisher
(ref. 3) suggests that with 02 inspired at a pressure
between 425 mmHg and 91 mmHg, there would be
neither oxygen toxicity effects nor hypoxia effects,
regardless of the length of exposure (fig. 1). On the basis
of these works, it would appear that use of an atmosphere
of pure 02 with a total pressure <425 mmHg may be safe
from a physiological point of view. However, work by
Morgan et al. (ref. 4) and Michel et al. (ref. 5) suggests
that even with 02 at low pressures, some physiological
changes, though temporary, are noted. More recent
reviews of the physiological effects of 02 toxicity (see,
for instance, ref. 6) suggest that the effects of high
concentrations of 02 at the molecular and cellular level
are only now beginning to be understood. It is not clear
whether such molecular/cellular level changes, if
documented, would pose a threat to an EVA crewman or
would be sufficient to decrease efficiency during
extended exposure to a reduced-pressure, high-oxygen
environment.
This is clearly a matter that requires rnore intensive, long-
duration study if an environment approaching pure 02 is
to be considered for future lunar and planetary missions.
These studies need to focus on oxygen toxicity in
reduced-pressure, pure 02 environments, covering the
"oxygen tolerance unlimited" section shown in figure 1.
Ideally, these studies should examine exposure for
durations extending to several months, simulating an
extended stay on the lunar surface or in an interplanetary
spacecraft. There may be additional work that can be
conducted in conjunction with these long-term studies
that will contribute to the general scientific understanding
of 02 effects at a cellular level and may indicate either
mitigating factors that can improve oxygen tolerance or
therapies that might overcome or inhibit the effect of
exposure to low-pressure, pure 02.
Assuming a mixed-gas environment, there is an
additional question concerning pressure requirements.
Several of the respondents of this study raised
questions about possible adaptation to lower-pressure
gas mixtures, that is, gases that would allow greater
EVA mobility. Since it appears that some level of
adaptation to reduced pressure is accomplished by
residents of mountainous areas, the direct
hypoxia/toxicity studies suggested above should be
supplemented, as possible, by analysis of any available
data related to naturally occurring low-pressure effects.
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Figure 1. Oxygen tolerance (from Roth [ref. 7], based on work reported in ref. 3).
2. Conduct an analysis/investigation of the flammability
issues associated with materials in low-pressure, high-
oxygen environments.
3. Conduct a focused evaluation into the availability and
near-term possibilities of new materials as they relate to
desired suit characteristics (e.g., weight, bulk, mass,
storability, serviceability, durability, comfort).
The flammability of on-board materials has been a
serious and ongoing concern since the Apollo fire in
January 1967. During the Apollo and Skylab programs,
the solution to potential flammability problems was to
limit the use of materials in the spacecraft to those
passing flame-propagation tests as "nonflammable." The
Space Shuttle program also adheres to strict flammability
standards. However, the problem has been significantly
reduced lay having a mixed N2/O 2 gas mixture at the
normal atmospheric pressure of 14.7 psi. A recent
overview evaluation of the flammability question is
reported in a trade study conducted for the First Lunar
Outpost EVA Study Team (ref. 8).
All materials used in spacecraft are subjected to
flammability tests in accordance with the requirements
specified in reference 9. At present, less than 5% of
tested polymer-based materials can pass the NHB 8060.1
flammability tests in a 70% 02 environment. Since
flammability tests are conducted at 1 atm, this still leaves
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open the question of what the flammability risk would be
at reduced pressures. Research in this area is needed to
form a baseline understanding of probable risk.
However, the more important question is whether new
materials can be identified that, while reducing the
flammability danger and meeting off-gassing and related
requirements, can also address the other long-duration
flight requirements. Important characteristics for long-
duration flight, and especially for materials for EVA
suits, include light weight, low mass and bulk, storability,
serviceability, durability, and comfort.
Developing crew garments and extravehicular mobility
unit (EMU) thermal/micrometeorite overgarments for use
in future missions will be a significant challenge. If
crews are to operate in a high-O2/low-pressure
environment in future missions, a vigorous program of
research and testing must be undertaken to develop these
materials. This research could be pursued along two
lines. The first would be to identify materials that were
not previously available and to conduct a series of tests to
determine which, if any, would be acceptable, including
their use in a high-O2/low-pressure environment. The
second would be to identify and specify the
characteristics needed, particularly for EVA suits, and to
provide these as research guidelines for fabric and
petrochemical industry research teams. A first step in
developing new materials for both general flight and
EVAspacesuitsewouldappeartobetoconvenea
workshoporaworkingrouptoidentifythescopeof the
problem and to recommend an approach to its solution.
4. Conduct a detailed task analysis to determine specific
performance requirements for advanced missions as
related to suits, gloves, and other elements of the EVA
system. Determine the priority of improvements needed
in terms of mission tasks. (Develop tasks and show how
improvements in suits, PLSS, and gloves would address
those tasks.)
5. Conduct an analysis of optimal-mobility requirements,
specifically the relationship between the workload
required to perform required tasks with a limited-mobility
suit and the workload required to perform similar tasks in
a high-mobility suit.
Efforts to establish design requirements for EVA systems
must begin with a thorough understanding of the tasks to
be performed. At the level of fine movements,
hand/glove requirements represent the most critical
element. An analysis is needed to determine specific
hand movements, movement durations and repetitions,
and opportunities for countermovements as well as an
understanding of what kinds of information are naturally
transmitted through the hands.
At the macro level, the research and development effort
should include an analysis of the tasks that the suit wearer
would be expected to perform, including the mobility
required to conduct those tasks. The tasks evaluated
should include a representative range, from the more
mundane, such as walking or lifting, to the more complex
tasks, for example, those associated with contingencies
such as bringing an incapacitated crewmember through
an airlock in either zero-g or in a gravity field. Each task
will then need to be deconvolved to understand the
individual suit motions necessary to complete it.
Although it is generally assumed that any increase in
EVA suit mobility is an improvement, there are a number
of situations in which additional mobility is neither
beneficial nor desired. In a gravity field, the wearer of a
highly mobile suit would need to support the weight of
the suit. Here it would be preferred that the suit have
sufficient stiffness to support itself. In the space shuttle
EVA suit, for example, the suit is stable and capable of
standing on its own when the knees are locked and the
weight of the suit is resting on a set of rigid legs. In this
situation, the wearer is able to rest simply by relaxing
against the suit. In the zero-g situation, an astronaut may
brace himself against the suit while he is held by foot
restraints. In this case, the rigidity of the suit becomes an
anchor point to help him move a large or bulky object.
In both these cases, the rigidity of the suit allows the
wearer to either perform more useful work or to avoid
additional work because the stiffness of the suit becomes
an aid to the wearer instead of a burden. An analysis of
mobility requirements, including workload measure-
ments, is needed to determine how much mobility is
enough--how much is too much. The point of building
just enough mobility was stressed by several of the
Apollo crewmen. In their view, building unneeded
mobility into a suit could lead not only to an increase in
cost and suit complexity but also to a decrease in
performance and an increase in workload.
The analyses of activities suggested here are likely to be
complex. One complicating factor in applying this task-
oriented approach to suit design is that it will tend to result
in suits that have very specialized uses and that may not be
readily modifiable for use in other applications. An
obvious example would be that a zero-g suit designed with
this kind of analysis in mind would have little adaptability
to walking in a gravity field. What this approach does
accomplish, however, is that it requires a complete
understanding of the suit applications. The process of
gaining this understanding should force the design team to
understand and to plan during the design process for any
anticipated evolution of the suit.
6. Incorporate, on an on-going basis, the up-to-date
knowledge of orthopedic (specifically hand) researchers
and practitioners into the glove design activity, and
develop and incorporate objectively determined
standards of performance and measurement into the
evaluations of gloves.
In addition to understanding what hand-related tasks are
required, we must also consider whether crew-members
reasonably can be expected to accomplish these tasks.
Previous development work has been hampered by a lack
of input from those in the orthopedic community who
conduct research into the biomechanics of hands. Given a
particular glove design, these researchers could anticipate
the level of dexterity provided and the kinds and degree of
hand, ann, or other fatigue that are likely to follow.
However, beyond that, it is likely that these researchers
could contribute substantially to the design of improved
gloves, that is, gloves that provide the least resistance to
normal hand motions in a particular environment.
An additional problem with glove development has been
the lack of objectively based, quantifiable standards of
performance that can be used to develop and evaluate new
glove designs. This problem has been pointed out
previously by O'Hara et al. (ref. 10). Problems associated
with objective performance measurements are in part due
to the complexity of motion of a normal hand and in part
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duetothecomplexityassociatedwithadequately
representingvariousenvironmentalworkingconditions.
Todate,theevaluationofglovesdesignedforuseinEVA
hasdependedheavilyoninputfromthegloveusers.
However,thismethodofevaluationcarriesitsownsetof
problems.Subjectiveinputsfromgloveusersinclude
individualfactorsuchaspaintolerance,physical
conditioning,thedegreeofhandfatiguebeforea
particularsetofactivitiesi started,theexperiencean
individualsubjecthasbothindoingataskandinworking
ingloves,andanyspecialconditions,uchasanexisting
handinjuryorthequalityofthefit ofaglove.Giventhis
complexity,it isdifficultoevaluateonthebasisofuser
reportswhetherchangesinaglovedesignareadequateor
if theycould,insomecases,resultinworseperformance
thanthatofapreviouslyprovendesign.
Anexampleof theproblemofsubjectiveglove valua-
tionistheflighttestoftheadvancedseriesgloves.
Evaluationsmadeduringpreflighttrainingin the
WeightlessEnvironmentTrainingFacility(WETF)led
gloveresearcherstobelievethathisnewglovewould
significantlyincreasecomfortandreducehandfatigue
relativetoexistingloves.However,duringflightthe
glovesdidnotworkaswellasin trainingandthehoped-
forimprovementsingloveperformancew renotrealized
(ref.11).Althoughusefulinprovidingaqualitative
assessmentofoverallperformance,subjectiveassess-
mentscannotprovidethecareful,multi-variate,numeri-
caldatathatareneededtodesignimprovedglovesthat
reducehandfatigueandincreasedexterityandtactility.
Althoughtherearenoobviousolutionstotheproblemof
adequatelymeasuringgloveperformance,therearesome
promisingleads.Therearepresentlyavailableinthe
physicalmedicineandrehabilitationliteraturexamples
ofobjectiveteststhatgivequantitativedataonthedegree
ofhandfunctioningundervaryingconditioas(e.g.,refs.
12-14).Oneexampleofthiskindofratingprotocolis
theJebsenHandFunctionTest(ref.15)whichisatest
thatmeasuresarangeofstandardhandfunctions
commonlyusedindailyactivities(see refs. 16 and 17).
Tests such as these measure the ability of a test subject to
complete a set of tasks that require coordinated uses of
various muscles. These tests are designed for use with
populations of varying capabilities. It is unlikely that any
one of the existing tests will be directly applicable to the
assessment of new gloves. However, it seems reasonable
that these kinds of tests can be adapted to allow direct
measurement and comparison of EVA glove designs.
The same community that conducts the kinds of
measurements discussed above also conducts applied
research into the development of orthotic devices that can
assist an individual with significant deficits in hand
functioning. These devices are designed either to
enhance an individual's degraded capabilities or to
provide conditions under which they can function in spite
of their deficits. If one accepts the proposition that
working in EVA gloves can, in a sense, be modeled as a
deficit of hand function, then this community may be able
to provide or design orthotic devices that will allow EVA
crewmembers to conduct a wide i'ange of tasks in spite of
the limitations imposed by the EVA gloves.
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